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Wenatchee lawyer picked for federal judgeship
Law Blogs |
2013/09/23 11:24
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The White House has nominated Wenatchee lawyer Stanley Bastian to become Eastern Washington's newest federal judge.
If approved by the Senate, he would replace Judge Edward Shea on the bench in Richland.
Bastian is a 1983 University of Washington Law School graduate who has served as an assistant city attorney in Seattle and as a state Appeals Court law clerk. He joined a Wenatchee firm in 1988.
The Spokesman-Review reports in the 1990s Bastian was hired by Douglas County to defend sheriff's investigators and prosecutors who were sued for their roles in the discredited Wenatchee sex ring case.
The Tri-City Herald reports Shea was the first federal judge to be based full-time in the Tri-Cities and went on senior status in June 2012, with a reduced workload. |
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Health care lawyer Clement as high court regular
Law Blogs |
2012/03/11 11:48
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Paul Clement used to argue for the federal government's power until he started arguing against it.
But he's no flip-flopping political candidate; he's a lawyer. Changes like this are part of his job.
Clement is playing a key role in three politically charged Supreme Court cases in which Republican-led states object to Obama administration policies or federal laws on health care, immigration and redrawing political boundaries.
In the biggest of those, the 45-year-old law school acquaintance of President Barack Obama will be trying to sink Obama's health care overhaul.
Not that long ago, Clement would regularly stand before the justices and defend even the most aggressive uses of federal power, making his case without written notes and parrying questions with an easy banter.
He argued for the Bush administration's policy on detaining suspected terrorists, a federal law outlawing a medical procedure called "partial-birth abortion" by opponents, the McCain-Feingold law aimed at limiting the influence of money in politics and a federal ban on the use of marijuana for medical purposes.
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Back Pay Award Reduced Based on Laches in Class Action
Law Blogs |
2012/03/01 10:21
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The Indiana Supreme Court recently decided what could prove to be a landmark decision on the doctrine of laches in Richmond State Hospital v. Brattain, Cause No. 49S02-1106-CV-327. If you are dealing with a case involving laches, this decision is a must read.
In this class action, employees who worked in "state institutions" claimed that the State had breached its contractual duty to provide equal pay for equal work by requiring that they work 40 hours per week for the same pay as employees in "state offices" who were only required to work 37.5 hours per week. The trial court found in favor of the employees and awarded 20 years of back pay, amounting to $42,422,788. The Court of Appeals reduced that award substantially by limiting back pay to a few months for merit employees but for non-merit employees, affirmed a recovery for 20 years of damages or about $18.7 million.
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and then failed to reach a majority on numerous issues, dividing 2-2. Justice Sullivan did not participate, presumably because he served as State Budget Director during the period in dispute. As a result of the 2-2 split, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on the merit employees' claims. As to the non-merit employees, the Supreme Court was able to reach a consensus, largely in favor of the State's laches defense.
http://www.indianalawupdate.com/entry/Back-Pay-Award-Reduced-Based-on-Laches-in-Class-Action
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Indiana Court of Appeals Disagrees Over Effect of Admissions
Law Blogs |
2011/07/21 09:03
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Today, the Indiana Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision, uncitable as authority under App. R. 65(D), in which the Court disagreed over the extent to which admissions could be used against a party in a motion for summary judgment in Clark v. Clark, Cause No. 01A02-1007-CT-759. While the decision itself cannot be used as precedent, the disagreement is informative.
In this case, a father and son traveled in a car together to the home of another person. When they arrived, the son got out of the car to help the father parallel park. The son positioned himself in front of his father's vehicle, between it and another vehicle parked in the alley. When the father's vehicle was in the appropriate position, the son signaled for the father to stop by putting his hand up. The father hit the gas pedal instead of the brake, and the son was pinned between his father's vehicle and the parked vehicle. The son sustained serious injuries to his leg. He brought suit against his father for his injuries and the father asserted the Indiana Guest Statute as an affirmative defense.
The Indiana Guest Statute provides that people with certain types of relationships, such as father-son, cannot sue each other for injuries arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle if the person is "in or upon" the vehicle at the time of the injuries. During the course of the litigation, the son sent requests for admissions to the father. Two of those requests and responses are reproduced below.
19. On September 5, 2007, at the time of the collision, Robert L. Clark, Jr. was not in the Chevrolet.
RESPONSE: At the moment of impact the plaintiff was not in the Chevrolet, whether he was a pedestrian is genuine issue for trial and therefore denied.
20. On September 5, 2007, at the time of the collision, Robert L. Clark, Jr. was not upon the Chevrolet.
RESPONSE: At the moment of impact the plaintiff was not upon the Chevrolet, whether he was a pedestrian is genuine issue for trial and therefore denied.
Based on those responses, the son moved for summary judgment. The father filed a cross-motion and the trial court granted the father's motion.
On appeal, the father argued that the admissions were not dispositive of whether the son was in or upon the vehicle at the time of his injuries because that is a legal conclusion that the Court would have to make after applying the law to the facts. The Court disagreed, holding that admissions can be directed to legal conclusions, not merely facts.
The dissent found the admissions ambiguous, because of the qualification about whether the son was a pedestrian and because there were questions concerning whether "in" and "upon" have the same generic meaning as they do as a legal term of art.
The lesson here is that requests for admissions can be powerful litigation tools and we lawyers must be careful when responding to them. You may find out that you have admitted something inadvertently.
Lesson:
1.Even a qualified response to a request for admission can count as an admission.
Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
http://www.indianalawupdate.com/entry/Indiana-Court-of-Appeals-Disagrees-Over-Effect-of-Admissions
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When is a Person an Employee of Another?
Law Blogs |
2011/07/20 09:25
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On July 19, 2011, the Indiana Court of Appeals issued a decision which I found surprising in McCann v. City of Anderson, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), Cause No. 48A02-1009-PL-1060. At issue was whether a trial court had properly granted summary judgment on the question of whether a warrant officer was an employee of the Anderson City Court. Despite the procedural posture of the case and factors that weighed in favor of finding an employer-employee relationship, the Court affirmed a decision granting summary judgment to the defendants.
In this case, McCann was a police officer, who eventually became warrant officer for the Anderson City Court in 1998. He held that post until 2005, when the judge asked that McCann be reassigned. As a result of this dismissal, McCann filed suit based on the Indiana Wage Statute, arguing that he had been an employee of the Court and was entitled to funds that had been allocated to the position of warrant officer by that court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted the defendants' motion.
On appeal, the Court quoted GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ind. 2001), for the seven factors that a court should consider when determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists. The Court then analyzed each of these factors and determined that three weighed in favor of the existence an employer-employee relationship and four against, with the "most important" factor weighing against.
Thus, over all, four of the seven factors, including the most important, "Control over the Means Used," indicate McCann was not an employee of the City Court. Because the City Court was not McCann's employer, he cannot be due any "unpaid wages" from the City Court. Therefore, he cannot assert a claim against the City Court under the Indiana Wage Statute.
The aspect of this decision that is most surprising is that the Court reached this conclusion despite the procedural posture of the case. It could have easily held that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to McCann, the seven factors weighed both for and against a finding of an employer-employee relationship between McCann and the City Court created a genuine issue of material fact. This indicates that the factor the Court identified as being "most important", whether the purported employer exercised control over the means used by the purported employee to perform work, is very important indeed.
Lesson:
1.It will be exceedingly difficult to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship if the purported employer did not exercise control over the means that the purported employee used to perform his work.
Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
http://www.indianalawupdate.com/entry/When-is-a-Person-an-Employee-of-Another
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